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BOOK REVIEW
Too LITTLE, Too LATE
BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD. By JOSEPH GOLD-
STEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT. New York: The Free Press, A
Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. 1979. Pp. xii, 288. $3.95
(softcover).
HILD custody law in its present state is unsatisfactory because
society is ambivalent about whose rights should be paramount.
Three different interests are involved in any action concerning the
care and training of children: those of the child, the parent, and the state
or society. The child obviously has an interest, but can neither express nor
know the form or substance of that interest. The parent has an interest and
sometimes can articulate both its nature and a program for protecting and
furthering it. The state, or society, has an interest in child custody based
on community needs and it has the power to bring about changes in the
status of custody. The state, however, lacks the predictive capability to
enable it to appreciate the full consequences and implications of its ac-
tions.
Given, therefore, those three interests involved in a child custody action,
the question arises: which interest should have the greatest weight in de-
termining the outcome? The authors of Before the Best Interests of the
Child' would favor the parents, consider the child, and disfavor the state.
In their view, "So long as a child is a member of a functioning family, his
paramount interest lies in the preservation of his family."'2 The authors
are quick to point out that because freedom from state interference in the
functioning family unit is in the child's interest, this emphasis on parental
autonomy is not to be viewed as a denigration of their "preference for
making a child's interest paramount."' 3 The thesis espoused in the book,
then, is a policy of minimum state intervention based on the belief that this
policy generally is in the child's best interest.
The authors of Before the Best Interests of the Child are the same three
who wrote Beyond the Best Interests of the Child,4 published in 1973. 5 The
1. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979) [hereinafter cited as BEFORE].
2. Id. at 5.
3. Id. at 7.
4. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (2d ed. 1979) (first published in 1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND].
5. The authors are a distinguished group. Joseph Goldstein is Sterling Professor of
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earlier work appeared at a time when the bias of the courts in custody
cases favored natural parents.6 Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit argued then
that more than biology is involved in the parent-child relationship, and
they popularized the concept of the psychological parent who may or may
not be the biological parent. 7 The impact of this book cannot be over-
estimated. It was widely reviewed and cited, although not necessarily fol-
lowed, by many judges.8 The book focused on the damage done to chil-
dren by the seemingly irrebuttable presumption that natural parents have
the right to custody of their children. The author's attack on this presump-
tion caused some to view the book as a tract favoring the destruction of the
natural family.9
Before the Best Interests of the Child should answer many of the criti-
cisms of the earlier book, as the authors try to make clear that in most
instances the interests of all are best served by the preservation of family
integrity. Family integrity is defined in Before the Best Interests of the
Child as encompassing the "three liberty interests of direct concern to chil-
dren (parental autonomy, the right to autonomous parents and privacy)." '0
By espousing this concept of family integrity, the authors naturally also
would favor minimum state intervention. This book is an attempt to de-
fine strictly the limits of the power of the state to intrude into the family in
child custody cases.
While this newer book is somewhat longer than Beyond the Best Interests
ofthe Child, it has many of the same defects. The authors are unquestion-
ably eminent in the field of child psychiatry, but this status does not mean
that their statements are persuasive without a factual basis."I Nor does the
great intellect of the authors guarantee that their ideas, though worthy, are
new. Before the Best Interests of the Child concerns an area in which much
activity, adjudication, and research has occurred. The authors have not
chosen to discuss the proposals of various other writers in the field, al-
though they are aware of them. 12 Instead, they have written as if their
voice was the first crying out against the various problems the book ad-
dresses. This tone of dogmatic uniqueness is unfortunate because much of
what the authors are espousing already has been widely considered by var-
Law at Yale University School of Law and Child Study Center, and has written in the areas
of criminal and family law. Anna Freud is the Director of the Hempstead Child Therapy
Clinic and has written numerous works on psychoanalysis and child development. Albert J.
Solnit is Sterling Professor of Pediatrics and Psychiatry at Yale University School of
Medicine and Director of the University's Child Study Center, and has written on the sub-
ject of child behavior and development.
6. See, e.g., Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 28 N.Y.2d 185, 269 N.E.2d
787, 321 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1971); Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. 1965); Szemler v.
Clements, 202 S.E.2d 880 (Va. 1974).
7. BEYOND, supra note 4, at 19.
8. See, e.g., Crouch, An Essay on the Critical and Judicial Reception of Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child, 13 FAM. L.Q. 49 (1979).
9. See id. at 72.
10. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 9.
11. See, e.g., id at 16, which cites as authority BEYOND.
12. See BEFORE, supra note 1, at 208, 210, 247.
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ious segments of the community. For example, the idea that state interfer-
ence in family matters should be as infrequent as possible is not
revolutionary. On a number of occasions the United States Supreme
Court has stated a preference for parents over the state, 13 especially in the
area of education.' 4 While the Court has not yet dealt directly with state
custody versus parental custody, it has indicated that it probably would
favor parental rights.' 5 In addition, lawyers and sociologists have done
extensive research and writing on the subject of the importance of prevent-
ing the state from unnecessarily interfering with the family unit, while pro-
tecting the safety of children. 16
One of the major proposals in Before the Best Interests of the Child is the
author's child placement code.17 The code is not based on any existing
code, nor does it attempt to incorporate or build on the suggestions of legal
scholars. 18 While a total change undoubtedly sometimes is necessary to
achieve any change, too radical a suggestion often is ignored. A major
change suggested by the authors, for example, is the definition of child
abuse. The difficulty of establishing a clear definition has not escaped the
notice of persons concerned with the care and protection of children. 19
The authors rely on the medical definition of child abuse, the "battered
child syndrome," which supposedly can be established by objective crite-
ria. Their definition, however, would not include emotional abuse. In-
stead, abuse would be limited to the infliction or attempted infliction of
serious bodily injury,20 or sexual abuse, for which the parents actually
were convicted in criminal court.21 As a result, by relying on the "battered
child syndrome" 22 the authors' proposals effectively would limit the state's
ability to intervene in cases of nonphysical child abuse, ignoring the fact
that emotional abuse, while unlikely to be life threatening, sometimes can
cripple the child's capacity to lead a productive life. Thus, the definition
proposed in the book, while appearing clear and easy to apply, in fact is
13. "[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim
to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the
structure of our society." Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
14. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
15. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816
(1977), in which the Court held that state-created foster parent-child relationships do not
require a hearing prior to a state-initiated change, but indicated that natural parents' rights
might be treated differently. Id. at 846.
16. See, e.g., R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE (1978); Solender, Family Law.-
Parent and Child, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 133, 147 n.l 12 (1977).
17. Id. at 167.
18. See general, R. MNOOKIN, supra note 16, at 577-90.
19. See J. GIOVANNONI & R. BECERRA, DEFINING CHILD ABUSE (1979) (a 302-page
work on the difficulty of arriving at concensus on a definition of child abuse).
20. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 72.
21. Id. at 62.
22. "The Battered-Child Syndrome is a term used by us to characterize a clinical condi-
tion in young children who have received serious physical abuse, generally from a parent or
foster parent." Kempe et al., The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 17
(1962) (emphasis added).
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deceptive. It diminishes the scope of the problem area, while leaving the
situation outside the circumscribed area unchanged.
The authors would minimize the possibility of state intervention not
only in child abuse cases, but also in all situations where the parents them-
selves have made provisions for the child's care. Thus, if the parents could
reach agreement privately on child custody in a divorce case, court ap-
proval would not be required.2 3 Without court involvement in the original
arrangement, changes could be made informally without the need for a
custody modification hearing. 24 Inability to reach agreement would be
grounds for intervention; 25 however, the usual custody agreement, which
now is so often hammered out by the parties' attorneys with court approval
in mind, would not be brought to the court's attention as it would be a
voluntary agreement. This change might mean that lawyers would not be
essential to child custody agreements and that members of the behavioral
professions could be substituted when needed.
Any exploration of the possible ramifications of such unsupervised pri-
vate custody agreements is precluded by the brevity of the book and its
emphasis on restricting the grounds for state intervention. The most obvi-
ous result is that these agreements probably would not be considered final
and frequently would be modified in small increments to suit the changing
needs of the parties. Modifications of this type undoubtedly occur now,
despite strict court orders to the contrary. Because a taint of guilt in such
self-help is likely, most people tending to be law-abiding, the suggested
reform might have some beneficial results. A controversial, though not
necessarily a deleterious, change might be an increase in the number of
joint custody arrangements. The authors apparently would favor such vol-
untary joint custody arrangements, given their support of noncoerced
agreements. Voluntary arrangements, the authors contend, permit the par-
ents to remain autonomous, thus protecting the somewhat dispersed fam-
ily's privacy and integrity. 26 Apparently, court supervised joint custody is
what the authors disfavor.2 7 The fact that the authors do not put much
emphasis on this aspect of their proposals is unfortunate because their ear-
lier work has been perceived as negating any consideration of joint cus-
tody.28
Some of the misunderstanding, if it is a misunderstanding, of the au-
thors' views on custody arrangements may stem from confusion as to the
authors' intended roles. In addition to being public advocates and origina-
tors of suggestions for broad changes in our legal structure, Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit are private practitioners of law or child psychology. 29 A
comment such as "every child requires continuity of care, an unbroken
23. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 32.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 31.
26. Id.
27. See BEYOND, supra note 4, at 117.
28. See, e.g., M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 105-16 (1978).
29. See BEFORE, supra note 1, at 118-21; BEYOND, supra note 4, at 125.
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relationship with at least one adult who is and wants to be directly respon-
sible for his daily needs," 30 can be construed as opposing day care for
young children or shared care by members of an extended family. The
comment, however, may merely reflect the kind of advice the authors
would give a private patient who had a choice as to different methods of
child-rearing. This may be the authors' choice as practitioners, but the
thrust of Before the Best Interests of the Child is that until a family unit is
broken either voluntarily or by a gross failure of parental care, full paren-
tal autonomy should not be abridged and state intervention should not be
allowed. Thus, families, the authors appear to believe, are entitled to
maintain a variety of structures, and the state should not enforce one
model over another.
The weakest section of this book concerns legal representation for chil-
dren. Beyond the Best Interests of the Child concluded that in matters of
child placement a child should have party status and be represented by
personal legal counsel.3 ' Left unanswered in that work were the difficult
questions of competence of counsel, attorney-client relationship and the
accompanying problem of attorney allegiance, and the method for and
time of appointment. Chapter 7 of Before the Best Interests of the Child
contains the authors' attempts to answer these questions.
32
In our society, a child in an intact family usually will not need in-
dependent representation. Should the need arise because of an external
situation, the parents will meet the need from their own resources or, when
necessary and provided, with state funds. Providing for personal represen-
tation for a child member of an intact family without the consent of the
parents can in itself create an adversary situation and thereby destroy fam-
ily integrity.33 No legal right apparently now exists for children who are a
part of an intact family to have independent representation in matters con-
cerning their own welfare. 34
Goldstein, Freud. and Solnit agree that children from an intact family
have no right to independent counsel. They cite In re Gault35 as authority
for the child's right to have his own parents make the decision with regard
30. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 40.
31. BEYOND, supra note 4, at 67.
32. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 111-29.
33. The phrase "family integrity" is used here in the sense that the authors use it. See
text accompanying note 9 supra.
34. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230-31 (1972). Contrast Chief Justice Bur-
ger's opinion in Yoder with Justice Douglas's dissent, in which Justice Douglas argues that
when children's interests may conflict with those of their parents, "the children should be
entitled to be heard." Id. at 244. The Court in this case held that the parents' right to free
exercise of religion under the first amendment to the United States Constitution had been
violated by the state's compulsory school attendance laws and carefully avoided ruling on a
child's independent right to schooling. If this issue had been addressed, then a child's right
to personal independent counsel might have been included. The discussion between Justices
Burger and Douglas is the closest the Court has come to addressing the problem of enforcing
an external resolution of problems that arise within an intact family.
35. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (child charged with delinquency is entitled to due process and
therefore has the right to be represented by counsel).
1981]
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to counsel even in delinquency matters, basing their interpretation on the
Court's statement that a child and his parents must be notified of the right
to counsel. 36 Other scholars, however, have interpreted the decision as
meaning that the right to counsel in criminal cases is the child's right and
cannot be waived by the indigency or indifference of the parents.3 7 This
distinction is important in criminal cases, as a solvent parent might desire
a child's incarceration and so fail to provide counsel, but it is especially
important in parent-child relationship cases. The parent-child relation-
ship, of course, normally is based on biology. This biological relationship
creates many legal obligations.38 The courts cannot change the biological
aspect of the parent-child relationship, but they can change or even sever
the legal obligations. Support and custody are the primary obligations
with which the courts deal, and these are not necessarily connected. Thus,
the possibility exists that one parent may seek a legal minimization or ter-
mination of the other parent's obligations without giving sufficient consid-
eration to the child's needs. The arrangement may be totally voluntary,
especially if it absolves one parent of all financial responsibility. This pos-
sible trade of visitation rights for no support obligation is what has created
the pressure for externally imposed child counsel rights to ensure that the
child's interests are adequately protected. The authors are correct, how-
ever, in pointing out that the appointment of counsel in disregard of the
parents' concerns is a form of intrusion and, thus, a violation of family
integrity by the state.3 9
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit would minimize the possibility of state in-
trusion by the procedural device of appointing counsel for the child only
after an adjudication has established a ground for modifying or terminat-
ing the parent-child relationship. 4° The idea that the appointment of an
attorney should be delayed until after a portion of the issue for which the
attorney is being appointed has been decided is hard, if not impossible, to
comprehend. Properly representing a client after the fact is extremely dif-
ficult. An adjudication of the need for state intervention would be based
on certain facts that, established without counsel, would be the facts with
which the child's appointed counsel would have to work in resolving the
question of disposition. Had counsel been appointed earlier, a different set
of facts might have been established, facts that could have led to a different
placement, or even to a conclusion that state intervention was not neces-
sary. Under the authors' plan the child's attorney must accept as a fact
that a need for state intervention exists and can act only as an advocate to
the court of a particular placement plan.41 Because the attorney probably
36. Id. at 41; see BEFORE, supra note 1, at 129.
37. See H. CLARK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS 479 (2d ed. 1974); R. MNOOKIN, supra note
16, at 108; Recent Depelopments--Domestic Relations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 177, 177-79
(1972).
38. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (if legitimate child can enforce claim
for support against father, so can illegitimate child).
39. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 112.
40. Id. at 114.
41. Id. at 111-12.
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is not a social worker, the attorney's role necessarily would be limited to
seeing that the placement plan as formulated would comply with the stat-
utes and due process. The attorney's role would be further limited, accord-
ing to the author's plan, because counsel should not be concerned with the
implementation of the plan, and any involvement with the child would
terminate upon final disposition.42
The attorney-client relationship when the client is incompetent is a
problem that has long troubled the legal profession. 43 Children, of course,
are members of the class of incompetents. The question for an attorney
who is appointed to represent a child is: who is the client? When a parent
is financially capable, most states expect the parent to pay the fee of the
child's attorney.44 When parents are not financially responsible, the state
generally pays that attorney.45 The unresolved question is: does the client
change based on financial circumstances, or is the client always the child?
If the client is the child, then the question arises as to the proper standards
to be applied by the lawyer to afford the child adequate representation.
The "best interest" standard is not adequate because most attorneys are
not child psychologists. The standard of "what a reasonable child would
want" is equally unworkable because most often the situation has arisen as
a result of unreasonableness. Most attorneys seemingly apply standards
based on their personal experience and background, and these may or may
not be suitable for the particular circumstances. 46
The authors of Before the Best Interests of the Child offer no real solu-
tion to the problem. They suggest that the court should be the advisor to
counsel in accordance with the statutes and that counsel should try to per-
suade the court to take into account such factors as the child's sense of time
and the limitations of experts.47 This theory suggests that the court is the
client, a view that is reinforced by the authors' advice that counsel might
turn to the parents and the child for information.48 The authors, however,
do not say that the court is the client, nor do they say the child is not the
42. Id. at 113.
43. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44
TEXAS L. REV. 424 (1966). See also ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
EC 7-12.
44. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5 1.10(d) (Vernon 1975): "The court shall order a
child's parent or other person responsible for support of the child to employ an attorney to
represent the child ...."
45. See, e.g., id. § 51.10(f): "The court shall appoint an attorney to represent the inter-
est of a child entitled to representation by an attorney, if. . .(2) the court determines that
the child's parent ...is financially unable to employ an attorney to represent the child
46. See Dembitz, BeyondAny Disrpline's Competence, 83 YALE L.J. 1304, 1308 (1974)
(book review of Beyond the Best Interests of the Child):
A ghetto child, [poverty lawyers] argue, must learn to cope with an environ-
ment filled with drugs, crime, prostitutes, pimps, and other perils. An extreme
of this argument. . was that a mother's deliberate punitive burning of her
seven-year-old daughter's arm with a curling iron was de minimis in compari-
son to the general misery of life in Harlem and should therefore be ignored in
considering the child's need for foster care.
47. BEFORE, supra note 1, at 122.
48. Id.
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client. In each situation, the authors describe the attorney's role as advi-
sory. The guidance offered to appointed counsel by Goldstein, Freud, and
Solnit is so nebulous that it appears almost intentionally nonhelpful. The
best conclusion that can be drawn is that the authors apparently would
prefer the role of attorneys in resolving problems of the parent-child rela-
tionship to be sharply diminished. 49 This preference accords with the
book's basic thesis, that state intervention should be minimized.
Before the Best Interests of the Child is a disappointing book. It suffers
from the same difficulty as do courts and social agencies, being too little,
too late. 50 Perhaps if it had been published prior to Beyond the Best Inter-
ests of the Child it would have made an important contribution to the
whole area of the state-parent-child relationship. So much has been stud-
ied and written about unnecessary and destructive state intervention in the
past few years that in order to make a contribution, this book should have
synthesized or incorporated the work of other scholars to formulate a com-
plete statement of the problem, and perhaps a solution. Beyond the Best
Interests of the Child was valuable because it argued so forcefully that a
biological connection with a child is not essential to, or even important in,
establishing a psychological relationship. This statement was accepted be-
cause it was convincingly phrased and because of the eminence of the au-
thors in child psychology. Before the Best Interests of the Child, however,
misses the mark because state intervention, while it may be wrong psycho-
logically, is a creature of the legal system, and revision of that system re-
quires legal expertise. Criticism of a legal form by nonlawyers often is an
essential element in the revision of that form. Prominence and achieve-
ment in child psychology, however, does not necessarily create credibility
for criticisms of a legal structure, even though the criticism is well-de-
served. The authors' contention that much state intervention in the par-
ent-child relationship is misplaced cannot be denied. Nonetheless, one
wishes that they had used more of the thinking of other members of the
legal profession in formulating their guidelines.
Ellen K Solender*
49. Id. at 112.
50. Id. at 134. To state the problem for society as the authors do: "Too Early, Too
Late, Too Much, or Too Little." Id. at 133.
* A.B., Oberlin College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.
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